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Chapter 4      Flower of the Desert: 
Poetics as Ontology from Leopardi to Negri 
Timothy S. Murphy 
 
Antonio Negri has gained a degree of notoriety at two distinct stages of his long career, 
for two very different reasons: first, in the Seventies, as a theorist and organizer of the Italian 
radical workers’ movement who was imprisoned without trial on charges of terrorism64, and 
later, in the new millennium, as a theorist of globalization who views it as a process without a 
center.65 The critical and journalistic preoccupation with these two admittedly important stages 
has almost completely obscured the rest of Negri’s long, varied and fascinating development as a 
thinker engaged with politics, ethics and ontology. Perhaps the most important aspect of his 
work that has been so obscured is the radical shift in his critical perspective that took place 
between the Seventies and the new millennium, a shift whose logic and reference points are still 
poorly understood by both his opponents and his admirers. This shift is what produced the 
Negri who is now so often cited, the Negri who often seems more closely allied with Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze than with the Marx and Lenin of his activist days. In what follows I 
will try to bring some of the logic and reference points of that shift to light, and in the process 
demonstrate how Negri “became what he is” — as Nietzsche would say.66 
Negri himself has acknowledged that his experience of imprisonment from his arrest 
on April 7, 1979 to his election to the Italian parliament in 1983 imposed a fundamental 
reorientation on his thought. It isolated him from the social and political movements to which 
he had dedicated more than a decade of his life and deprived him of most of the intellectual tools 
necessary to continue the militant analysis of the present that had preoccupied him during that 
period. His only alternative was to turn back to his original scholarly training in the history of 
philosophy, but with a significant difference. In the preface to The Savage Anomaly he notes 
that 
 
It is incontestable that an important stimulus to studying the origins of Modern thought 
and the Modern history of the State lies in the recognition that the analysis of the 
genetic crisis can be useful for clarifying the terms of the dissolution of the capitalist 
and bourgeois State. However, even though this project did form the core of some of my 
earlier studies (on Descartes, for example), today it holds less interest for me. What 
interests me, in fact, is not so much the origins of the bourgeois State and its crisis but, 
rather, the theoretical alternatives and the suggestive possibilities offered by the 
revolution in process.67 
 
We might paraphrase this shift, in terms that Negri sometimes uses, as a transition 
from the pars destruens or destructive step of the dissolution of the capitalist state to the pars 
constuens or constructive step of constitutive ontology.68 The Savage Anomaly (1981) itself, 
                                                             
64 On Negri’s imprisonment and trial (in that order), see my introduction to Negri’s Books for Burning: 
Between Democracy and Civil War in 1970s Italy (New York: Verso, 2005). 
65 See of course Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), and the forthcoming 
Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), as well as the extensive critical literature that has 
arisen around those texts. 
66 See the subtitle to Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is (in Basic Writings of 
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufman [New York: Modern Library, 1968], p.671). 
67 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael 
Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp.xx-xxi. 
68 On this terminology, see Michael Hardt, “Into the Factory: Negri’s Lenin and the Subjective Caesura 
(1968-73)” in Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-Karim Mustapha, eds., The Philosophy of Antonio Negri: Resistance in 
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which bears the dateline “From the prisons of Rovigo, Rebibbia, Fossombrone, Palmi and Trani, 
April 7, 1979 – April 7, 1980”69, is only the earliest and most visible manifestation of this 
reorientation, at least for Anglophone readers, but by itself it does not reveal the full magnitude 
of the shift. To grasp the real extent of his reorientation, readers must engage Negri’s other 
works of the period that explicitly bear the imprint of his prison experience, such as Fabbriche 
del soggetto [Factories of the Subject] (1987) and Politics of Subversion (1988), works of 
political philosophy in which he first lays out the contours of his constitutive ontology, as well as 
Il lavoro di Giobbe [The Labor of Job] (1990) and my primary subject today, Lenta ginestra: 
Saggio sull’ontologia di Giacomo Leopardi [Gentle Broom: On Giacomo Leopardi’s Ontology] 
(1987), works of essentially literary analysis which lay the groundwork for what we might call 
the linguistic or poetic “turn” his thought has taken as part of its pars construens. Negri’s work 
on Spinoza has been widely analyzed, and his constitutive ontology has also been engaged from 
a variety of critical perspectives, but his poetic turn has attracted little attention as yet, despite 
the fact that it forms the basis for much of his work on immaterial labor and network 
resistance.70 
The other striking aspect of Negri’s reorientation that is bound up with his poetic turn 
and that similarly deserves to be brought to light is the shift in his attitude toward the tradition 
of French Nietzscheanism, by which I mean primarily the work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel 
Foucault. In his pre-prison writings, references to those thinkers are few, and they tend to be 
rather ambivalent, as in the account of Foucault in the essay “Sulla metodo della critica della 
politica” [On the Method of the Critique of Politics] (1977)71, whereas after his relocation to Paris, 
Negri begins to place Foucault’s conceptions of biopower and biopolitics and Deleuze’s logic of 
radical immanence at the center of his own project. This rapprochement can be partially 
understood ad hominem as a consequence of the fact that it was the philosophical circle around 
Deleuze, most importantly Félix Guattari, which embraced and supported Negri before his 
imprisonment and during his Parisian exile as a result of shared political convictions as well as 
the convergence between his Spinoza interpretation and Deleuze’s own.72 To understand the 
shift ad rem is somewhat more complicated, however, given Negri’s prior ambivalence to 
Foucault’s Nietzschean methods and the apparent absence of Nietzsche from his own earlier 
philosophical frame of reference. Indeed, Negri has only ever written one essay on Nietzsche: 
“Marxistes: une approche paradoxale” [Marxists: A Paradoxical Approach], published in 1992, is 
a very brief account of Marxist responses to Nietzsche from Lukács onward. Can such a brief — 
and belated — textual engagement with Nietzsche actually account for the shift in Negri’s 
philosophical perspective? 
In the course of a very careful and suggestive contextual reading of that single essay on 
Nietzsche, Judith Revel has shown that Negri, like others who emerged from the current known 
as autonomist Marxism, “found in Nietzsche a reformulation of the link between subjectivity 
and production from the viewpoint of creation, a violent polemic against a dialectical 
understanding of history, and a radical critique of real socialism in all its varieties”.73 Central to 
this approach is the practice of reading Nietzsche “no longer from within a modernity for which 
                                                             
Practice (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp.7-37. 
69 Negri, Savage Anomaly, p.xxiii. 
70 It also connects his work closely to that of Paolo Virno, Christian Marazzi, Maurizio Lazzarato, and others 
working in the field of “cognitive capitalism”. 
71 Antonio Negri, Macchina tempo: Rompicapi Liberazione Costituzione (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1982) pp.70-84. 
This essay was originally published in the philosophy journal Aut Aut in 1978. 
72 See Antonio Negri and Anne Dufourmantelle, Negri on Negri, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp.42-50. 
73 Judith Revel, “Antonio Negri, French Nietzschean? From the Will to Power to the Ontology of Power” in 
Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-Karim Mustapha, eds., The Philosophy of Antonio Negri 2: Revolution in Theory 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.91-92. 
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he would serve as the signifier of a profound crisis, decadence or alternately even the horizon of 
redemption, but instead in an anti-modern manner”, which entails the affirmation of “the 
necessity of overcoming modernity, or…the idea that a different model of modernity was 
possible”.74 In terms of Nietzsche’s concepts, this approach focuses not on the transvaluation of 
all values or the overman but rather on “the will to power as the subjective power of creation and 
inauguration and the construction of a model of historicity that functions as a critique of 
scientific positivism and of the Hegelian dialectic at the same time”.75 She goes on to explain 
quite convincingly how, “On the basis of this double lineage — a ‘French-style’ historicism of 
which Foucault will become the most striking figure, and a Spinozism of power that owes so 
much to Deleuze — we can understand Negri’s Nietzscheanism”.76 
A question remains, though: what is the immediate source of all these Nietzschean 
elements in Negri’s writings? They don’t arise from direct engagements with Nietzsche; even 
Negri’s post-prison writings contain only occasional and peripheral references to Nietzsche, 
often framed by Heidegger’s reading. They don’t seem to arise from explicit reconsiderations of 
the Nietzschean elements in Deleuze and Foucault either; by the time he begins to write about 
his new allies, the reorientation has already taken place. Yet Revel is undoubtedly right to 
describe Negri as a “French Nietzschean”, and I will argue that the source of all the Nietzschean 
elements that she identifies — an “untimely” critique of dialectical and scientistic history, an 
implacable antagonism toward the abstract administration of life, and subjectivation and 
ontology conceived as creation or poiesis — lies precisely in his interpretation of the Italian 
philologist, essayist and poet Giacomo Leopardi. As Revel herself notes in passing, the 
“anti-modern” interpretation of Nietzsche “was first inferred by Mazzino Montinari [the Italian 
co-editor, with Giorgio Colli, of the definitive edition of Nietzsche’s works], in the wake of the 
approach that [Cesare] Luporini and [Sebastiano] Timpanaro had applied to the works of 
Giacomo Leopardi, which could be considered in many ways as anticipating those of 
Nietzsche”.77 Thus I am claiming that Leopardi serves Negri as an anticipatory stand-in for 
Nietzsche, a dark or not-so-dark precursor who connects Negri’s work to the heterogeneous 
series of Foucault and Deleuze.78 In addition, Leopardi compels Negri to confront for the first 
time the constitutive role that language plays in the production of subjectivity and community. 
Leopardi thereby provided Negri with many of the same theoretical tools that Nietzsche gave to 
Deleuze and Foucault, and consequently made possible Negri’s new line of alliance and his 
poetic turn despite his minimal direct engagement with Nietzsche. 
Despite his canonical stature in the history of Italian poetry — where he is lauded as 
the peer of Dante and Plutarch — Leopardi is not widely read, or even widely known, in the 
Anglophone world, so it is not surprising that Negri’s study of Leopardi has been ignored by 
Anglophone critics. A little background may therefore be in order. Leopardi was born to an 
aristocratic family in the provincial town of Recanati in 1798 and, after struggling most of his life 
to escape that suffocating environment, died in Naples in 1837. Aside from brief periods of study 
with tutors, he was almost entirely self-taught in the fields of his greatest achievement, namely 
classical philology, the history of philosophy and poetry; indeed, so intense was his independent 
study that it permanently impaired his physical health and contributed to his early death. His 
                                                             
74 This anti-modern reading of Nietzsche closely parallels Negri’s reading of Spinoza; see his essay 
“Spinoza’s Anti-Modernity” in Negri, Subversive Spinoza: (Un)Contemporary Variations, trans. Timothy S. Murphy 
et al (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.79-93. 
75 Revel, p.91. 
76 Revel, p.104. 
77 Revel, p.91. 
78 Negri has acknowledged the similarities between Leopardi and Spinoza that drew him to both thinkers 
during his time in prison, and while these overlap with the similarities between Leopardi & Nietzsche, they are 
ultimately distinct. See his essay “Between Infinity and Community: Notes on Materialism in Spinoza and Leopardi” 
in Subversive Spinoza, pp.59-78. 
 63 
poetic output was comparatively small — 36 poems, primarily in the lyric mode, that occupy 
fewer than 150 pages in his collected works — but it is extended and enriched by his prose 
writings, most importantly his Moral Essays and his massive, posthumously published 
philosophical/critical notebooks, the Zibaldone. His prose writings in particular reveal his 
assiduous study of the anti-idealist philosophies that contributed essential elements to his own 
materialist metaphysics: Locke’s critique of innate ideas, Condillac’s sensationalism, the 
Enlightenment materialism of La Mettrie and d’Holbach, and so on.79 
As in the case of his study of Spinoza, Negri’s account of Leopardi’s development 
stresses its discontinuities. Whereas in Spinoza he identified a second, immanent and 
productive “second foundation” that displaced the first, neo-Platonic and emanationist 
foundation of the Ethics toward a constitutive ontology, in Leopardi he identifies five stages of 
nonlinear development: 
 
In the first period Leopardi confronts the dialectical culture of the beginning of the 
nineteenth century; in the second he shifts his focus toward a radical sensualist theory, 
with points of extreme pessimism; in the third and fourth periods Leopardi attempts, 
with various different motivations, to develop an approach to history and strives to 
reconstruct an ethical perspective; in the fifth period, he theorizes human community 
and the urgency of liberation.80 
 
Leopardi’s last great poem, “La ginestra, o il fiore del deserto” [“The Broom, or, The 
Flower of the Desert”], recapitulates this process of development and in so doing serves as the 
culmination of Negri’s account of the poet’s poetic, political and philosophical project. I will 
refer often to “The Broom” in laying out the broad outlines of what I am calling Leopardi’s 
anticipatory Nietzscheanism. 
Nietzsche himself was well aware of his predecessor’s achievements, and described 
Leopardi as “perhaps the greatest stylist of the century” 81  and “the modern ideal of a 
philologist”. 82  This tribute is particularly significant because it arises in the context of 
Nietzsche’s meditation on their shared profession, classical philology, whose methods led them 
to remarkably similar conclusions regarding history, society and existence. For example, 
Nietzsche’s conception of the “untimely” has been widely influential, but his readers often forget 
that he first presented it as precisely the critical power of classical philology: “I do not know 
what meaning classical studies could have for our time if they were not untimely — that is to say, 
acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a 
time to come”.83 In the second Untimely Meditation, from which that famous quotation is 
drawn, Nietzschean untimeliness takes the form of a virulent critique of the positivistic, 
teleological “science” of history, denounced as the desubjectified accumulation of indifferent 
data that fossilizes life in the present and denies it a future. Contrasting this science to the 
ancient Greeks’ subordination of history to life, Nietzsche traces the problem back to the 
Hegelian philosophy of history, the inevitable coming to consciousness of spirit in its dialectical 
passage through matter and time that culminates in the non-culture of the nineteenth century: 
 
The belief that one is a latecomer of the ages is, in any case, paralyzing and depressing; 
                                                             
79 For a quick outline of Leopardi’s materialism in English, see Negri’s “Between Infinity and Community”, 
pp.63-64. 
80 Negri, “Between Infinity and Community”, p.77n23. 
81 Nietzsche, “We Philologists” in The Complete Works of Nietzsche volume 8, ed. Oscar Levy and trans. J.M. 
Kennedy (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1911), section 63. 
82 Nietzsche, “We Philologists”, section 10. 
83 Nietzsche, “On the uses and disadvantages of history for life” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.60. 
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but it must appear dreadful and devastating when such a belief one day by a bold 
inversion raises this latecomer to godhood as the true meaning and goal of all previous 
events, when his miserable condition is equated with a completion of world-history … 
for Hegel the climax and terminus of the world-process coincided with his own 
existence in Berlin.84 
 
A generation before Nietzsche, almost contemporaneous with Hegel, Leopardi was 
already thinking in an “untimely” fashion on the basis of his own youthful studies in classical 
philology. As Negri sees it, Leopardi responds to the “catastrophe of memory” that is the 
confused aftermath of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
restoration in an anti-Hegelian — and anti-modern — way. Negri insists that 
 
The dialectic shatters the confusion of historical time, intervening into the catastrophe 
of memory and, with Hegel, re-ordering everything… the difference is resolved into a 
sublime, reasonable overdetermination of the totality of development. The historical 
delay allows Hegel to conceive philosophy as the “owl of Minerva” that explores, 
re-organizes and sanctifies historical effectiveness. The confusion and error of memory 
become the logic of history.85 
 
Thus the synthesizing teleology of dialectical history transforms the unpredictable 
whiplash of revolution and reaction into an epiphenomenon of linear development, turning 
history into a ruse of reason and reducing the constituent power of the revolutionary movement 
to the constituted power of the state. While Leopardi, like Hegel, displaces the historical 
catastrophe to the metaphysical plane, for him “this translation of the event leaves the problem 
open and indicates, within the time of the dialectic, not a logical solution but an ethical opening”. 
This opening is the immanent and material space in which subjective agency is constructed, as 
we will see shortly. In this Leopardi resembles Hölderlin: “Within the time of the dialectic, 
confronted by the need to establish distinctions in the chaos of memory, both of them refuse the 
logical solution and idealist foundation of science” (LG 31). This commitment to poetic creation 
and ethical practice over logical closure leads Leopardi to attack the teleological progressivism 
that his era was just beginning to learn from Hegel. In “The Broom” he ironically presents the 
unstable landscape around Vesuvius as a depiction of 
… the impressive destiny 
and fated progress of the human race.  
Here see yourself reflected,  
Proud century and stupid,  
You who have left the way 
Where man’s renascent thought had made its mark 
And signaled you to follow, you who take 
Some pride in moving backwards 
And even call it progress” (ll.50-58).86  
 
One of the main objects of Leopardi’s untimely critique of progressive history, which 
Negri often describes as a “dialectic of Enlightenment” that directly anticipates Horkheimer and 
                                                             
84 Nietzsche, “On the uses and disadvantages of history for life”, p.104. This is the aspect of Nietzsche’s work 
that was most significant for Foucault; see Revel, pp.96-100. 
85 Antonio Negri, Lenta ginestra: Saggio sull’ontologia di Giacomo Leopardi (Milan: Mimesis, 2001; 
originally published by SugarCo in 1987), p.31. Further references to this edition will be noted parenthetically in my 
text with the abbreviation LG. 
86 Throughout this paper I cite J.G. Nichols’ translation of “The Broom” from The Canti (London: Carcanet, 
1994), pp.141-148. Further references to it by line numbers will be included parenthetically in my text. 
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Adorno’s analyses,87 is what Negri will later call, following Foucault, biopower: the institutional 
management of life that develops through the sciences of public health, education and 
administration in the course of the nineteenth century, which become key weapons in the 
arsenals of both the democratic reformists and the monarchical reactionaries. Leopardi 
denounces what he calls the “statistical” approach of these sciences as a project for producing 
docile, interchangeable social and political subjects for the European nation-states that were still 
being consolidated, alternately by democrats and monarchists, during his lifetime. For Leopardi 
as for Horkheimer and Adorno, this project exemplifies the subordination of critical reason to 
the institutional unreason of the despotic state, which Negri calls a “false illusion” that must be 
fought in the name of the “true illusion” of revolutionary community (I will return to this point 
below). Linked to his denunciation of statistics is Leopardi’s attack on mass-market journalism 
as a tool for molding public opinion, which in some ways anticipates Benedict Anderson’s 
identification of the modern nation-form with the rise of what he calls “print capitalism”.88  
Leopardi’s contempt for both aspects of this project leads him to the point of viciously parodying 
the culmination of Italian progressivist ideology, the Risorgimento or unification of the Italian 
nation that was underway during his lifetime, in his mock-epic “The War of the Mice and the 
Crabs” (see LG 182-202). This contempt for the structural unreason of the 
progressivist/nationalist project appears in “The Broom” as a bitter address to the 
administrators of human life: 
 
You dream of liberty, but also wish 
To enslave that thought by which 
Alone we rose a little 
Above barbarity, by which alone 
We grow in civil living, and which only 
Betters the people’s lot” (ll.72-77). 
 
In Leopardi’s untimely critique of statistics and mass administration we can hear 
echoes of Nietzsche’s later critique of socialism and democracy as continuations of the ascetic 
ideal and “heir[s] of the Christian movement” against life: the anarchists, for example, 
seem opposites of the peacefully industrious democrats and ideologists of revolution, 
and even more so of the doltish philosophasters and brotherhood enthusiasts who 
call themselves socialists and want a “free society”; but in fact they are at one with the 
lot in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every other form of society except 
that of the autonomous herd … They are at one in their tough resistance to every 
special claim, every special right and privilege (which means in the last analysis, 
every right: for once all are equal nobody needs “rights” any more).89 
 
Although Nietzsche does not focus on statistics and journalism as Leopardi does, he 
identifies a similar threat in mass or herd democracy: the threat of de-differentiation, the 
reduction and co-optation of difference for purposes of command and control. Nietzsche calls 
the statisticians of life “levelers”90 whose work “will on average lead to the leveling and 
mediocritization of man — to a useful, industrious, handy, multi-purpose herd animal”.91 His 
                                                             
87 Negri directly interrogates Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of Enlightenment, and Adorno’s theory of 
the end of poetry that follows from it, in his essay “Art and Culture in the Age of Empire and the Time of the 
Multitudes”, trans. Max Henninger, in SubStance 112 (2007), pp.48-55. 
88 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 1983), especially chapter three, pp.37-46. 
89 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, section 202, p.306. 
90 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 44, p.244. 
91 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 242, p.366. 
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parallel critique of the “disease” of German nationalism, and nationalism in general, is well 
known.92 
Finally, we come to the anti-dialectical alternative to both progressive or teleological 
history and the statistical administration of life that Negri finds in Leopardi’s “metaphysics of 
constitution” (LG 217). The explication of that metaphysics or ontology, which occupies the 
entirety of Lenta ginestra, is far too complex to follow in detail here, but Negri summarizes it as 
a prelude to his reading of “The Broom” at the end of the volume. His analysis identifies three 
key steps that have clear Nietzschean resonances. The first step is 
 
a complete and radical revision of the concept of nature. [In Leopardi] it appears not as 
a unitary essence but rather immediately as a split, as one of the masks of the 
vicissitudes of being and it is implicated in the catastrophe that constitutes its essence… 
This concept of nature is set before us as a context of alternative values that must be 
distinguished. Nature is something split, therefore it is the terrain of a choice to which 
we are pressed or rather constrained by the possibility of destruction and death that it 
implies (LG 216-217). 
 
Leopardi sees nature not as an undifferentiated unity opposed to human civilization 
nor as the subordinate counterpart of a triumphant dialectical reason but rather as an active 
nothingness, a faceless, non-subjective antagonism toward all of its productions (including the 
human subject), “the ruin of all rational consistency” (LG 206) that bears comparison to 
Nietzsche’s conception of the “original Titanic divine order of terror”, “the terror and horror of 
[non-individuated] existence” delineated most forcefully in The Birth of Tragedy.93 In “The 
Broom”, this conception of nature is figured as “Vesuvius the destroyer” (l.3), whose lava flows 
obliterated Pompeii but later provide fields where the broom grows — but only until the next 
eruption. The volcano’s slope starkly displays “How humankind is held/In nature’s loving 
hand”: nature is both life and death, strength and weakness, creation and destruction, and the 
immanent difference between those aspects offers the possibility of a choice, a selection or 
affirmation within and against nature that produces the human subject — which is figured as, 
but also contrasted with, the gentle broom itself, “denizen of the desert” (l.7) — in the struggle of 
life against death. This conception of a differentiating and differentiated nature entails many of 
the same consequences as Nietzsche’s ontological conception of will to power.94 
From this split in nature a second step follows, which concerns the subject in its 
relation to nature, the subject that stands up to it or struggles against it: 
 
In the constitutive passage that we are now beginning to verify between the critical 
event — that is, the recognition of a gap in knowledge faced with the nothingness in 
which the spirit threatens to founder — and an ethical act, a constructive gap opens up, 
an attempt not merely to escape nothingness but rather, on the basis of this separation, 
an attempt to constitute the schema of the ontological imagination emerges. (LG 217) 
 
Negri sees Leopardi’s ontology opposed not only to the Hegelian teleology of absolute 
spirit but also to what he sees as the source of its apotheosis of reason, namely Kant’s 
transcendental analytic that subordinates the imagination, as a purely instrumental faculty, to 
reason. Against this, Leopardi presents the imagination as an ontological activity that responds 
                                                             
92 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 251, p.377. 
93 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, section 3, p.42. 
94 See, among other things, the famous final aphorisms (1066 and 1067, pp.548-550) in Nietzsche’s The Will 
to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1967). 
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to the antagonism of nature by creating active illusions for its own survival95: 
 
If we return to Kantian terminology, this means that the transcendental aesthetic, far 
from seeking the analytic or demanding that it complete the possible deduction of the 
subject, instead opposes the analytic, recognizes it as a hostile function, as a mystifying 
trap from which it must free itself or preferably avoid altogether. In the critical making 
[fare] of poetry, the transcendental aesthetic reveals the essence of the subject, its 
opening to the world, to the imagination, to the true illusion and against the analytic 
prison of the logically true. (LG 208)96 
 
These illusions, whose logic corresponds quite closely to the genealogy of truth as 
“illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” that Nietzsche outlines in “On Truth and Lying 
in the Nonmoral Sense”,97 constitute a “second nature”, a transformed or reconstituted world 
within which the subject can survive and even thrive. This is Leopardi’s way of assenting, in 
advance, to Nietzsche’s claim that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the 
world are eternally justified”98, if we understand “justified” to mean something like “made 
livable for particular forms of life”. 
But distinctions arise and choices between affirmation and negation must be made 
within second nature as well, ethical choices between “true and false illusions”, which 
correspond to the Nietzschean choices between “good”, life-affirming illusions and “bad”, 
pathological ones. This is the third and final step of Leopardi’s constitutive ontology. As Negri 
notes, 
 
The nature-subject antagonism is dynamic and open as a result of a double rupture: 
first on the side nature, by a series of radical alternatives that oppose the values of 
positive and negative, life and death, youth and age; then on the side of the subject 
moving between nothingness and the being of consciousness, seeking life and opposing 
death. It seeks to understand the relation that ties it to nature across the complexity of 
exclusions, alternatives and ethical choices that compose this relation. (LG 217) 
 
Such ethical choices figure into “The Broom” as the contrast between humankind’s 
arrogant belief that it is “the lord and end of all” (l.189) for whose sake “the authors of the 
universe came down,/… and held a conversation” (ll.192-193) and the lesson of the broom, 
whose head “was never bowed before/In craven supplication and in vain/To the oppressor [i.e., 
nature]; never held erect/Either, in crazy pride towards the stars” (ll.307-310). This contrast in 
the poem also marks the persistence of Leopardi’s critique of Christianity as anthropomorphism, 
which has several additional points of convergence with Nietzsche’s that are beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
                                                             
95 See passages in Leopardi’s Zibaldone such as the following: “imagination is the source of reason, as it is of 
feeling, passions, poetry. This faculty that we suppose to be a principle, a distinct and determined quality of the 
human soul, either does not exist or it is merely the same thing, the same disposition along with a hundred others that 
we distinguish absolutely from it, and with the same thing we call reflection or the faculty to reflect, and with what we 
call intellect etc.  Imagination and intellect are the same.” (Leopardi, Zibaldone: A Selection, trans. Martha King and 
Daniela Bini [New York: Peter Lang, 1992], p.149. 
96 Compare to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche as a critic of Kantian morality in chapter 3 of Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), and Michael Hardt’s identification 
of this “triangulation” with Deleuze’s general project of anti-Hegelianism in Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in 
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp.27-30). 
97 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from 
Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed. and trans. Daniel Brazeale (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1979), p. 
98 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 5, p.52. 
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The ultimate expression of the ethical demand to choose “true illusions” lies in the 
impulse toward community as a new collective subject, and this is the point at which Leopardi’s 
thought most significantly diverges from Nietzsche’s, at least as the latter is most often 
understood. As Negri sees it, “The ethical community is born, positively, in the separation”, the 
fissure or gap in nature that only the constitutive imagination can fill: 
 
the necessity of the “common war” [against nature as catastrophe] posits the 
conditions of solidarity and, through it, freedom… The community, therefore, is 
opposed to nature to the point that it is born from the conflict itself. The community is 
the collective subject that constructs itself within the horizon of the war. (LG 220-222) 
This conception of community appears in Leopardi’s work for the first time in “The 
Broom”; like Spinoza, he turns his attention to the issue of effective political community only at 
the end of his life and in relatively ambiguous terms that have been interpreted in divergent 
ways by his readers.99 The identification of nature as the inescapable and undefeatable common 
enemy, however, is clear: “He is a noble being/Who lifts — he is so bold –/His mortal eyes 
against/The common doom, and with an honest tongue,/Admits the evils of our destiny,/Our 
feeble lowly state;/…/But fixes guilt where it belongs, on Mother/Nature: mother because she 
bears us all,/Stepmother, though, by virtue of her will./She is his enemy” (ll.111-17, 123-26). 
According to Negri’s reading, because of the infinite disproportion of power between nature and 
humankind (registered explicitly in the poem’s meditation on infinity in lines 167-183), the only 
effective resistance to such an enemy lies in community: “since he [that is, the noble being] 
thinks,/What is the simple truth,/Mankind has been united, organized,/Against her from the 
first,/He sees all men as allies of each other,/And he accepts them all/With true affection, 
giving/The prompt assistance he expects from them/In all the varying danger and the 
troubles/Their common war gives rise to” (ll.126-35). The broom too reflects this recognition of 
the power of community — at the start of the poem, the flowers are “spread… in solitary tufts” 
(l.5), but by the end they grow into “sweetly scented thickets” (l.298). 
The ethical affirmation of community thus conceived is predicated not on pure or 
practical reason but rather on the aesthetics — or rather the poetics, which is to say the poiesis 
or imaginative “making” [fare] 100 , of empowering “true illusions”, and such practical 
empowerment is the only possible immanent meaning of truth for Leopardi as it is for Nietzsche. 
As Negri says, “The true can only be constituted in making. It only exists as subordinate to 
making” (LG 208). Clearly the ontological making or poiesis at stake here goes far beyond the 
literary genre of poetry, but it does very emphatically include poetic language as a privileged 
instance. 101 At the close of his study, Negri sums up its results as follows: 
 
In a materialist universe, truth is a name and the universal is a convention, but poetry, 
on the contrary, is a concretization, a process of construction. Poetry is the conclusion 
                                                             
99 See Spinoza’s Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), chapter 11, 
pp.135-137, as well as Negri’s attempt to complete Spinoza’s conception of democracy in “Reliqua desiderantur: A 
Conjecture for a Definition of the Concept of Democracy in the Final Spinoza” in Subversive Spinoza, pp.28-58. 
100 Negri’s usage of poiesis seems to refer implicitly to Heidegger’s distinction between the repeatable, 
rule-generating/governed praxis of the craftsman and scientist and the poiesis of the artist that exceeds any technical 
repetition or rule and thereby implicates existence (see “…Poetically Man Dwells…” in Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, 
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter [New York: Harper & Row, 1971], pp.211-229). However, Negri’s conception of 
living labor, derived from Marx, deconstructs this opposition to posit poiesis as the defining characteristic of all 
production of value. 
101 For another gloss on this, see also Negri’s Arte e multitude: Neuf letters sur l’Art (Paris: Editions EPEL, 
2005): “The first paradox is that of an aesthetic, that is to say a discourse on the beautiful, which, when it confronts 
this concreteness of the body, can no longer be given…Thus only a poetics can exist, consist, be given: a poetics as a 
very singular artistic poiesis, as an action expressing a practice of the beautiful from within acting. No discourse can 
describe it—only a participatory discourse of poetics will be capable to expressing it” (pp.19-20). 
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of a making within the concrete and within immediacy. Thus every truth has a poetic 
aspect from the moment it becomes real…. Ethical practice is situated between poetry 
and the true. It is a “making” set in motion by freedom that determines the constitution 
of the true. (LG 227) 
 
Thus conceived, poetry not only constitutes the true but it also gives history an 
immanent meaning and direction: 
 
To confer a sense on history, poetry must appear as an act of the practical constitution 
of being, not as a handmaid of the true but as productive of the true in the practical and 
material sense. In this way it constitutes a significant ontological activity…. It is the 
voice of an analytical making whose comprehensive material and constitutive force 
extends from sense to feeling, from experience to history. (LG 203-204) 
 
Therefore poetry is the aesthetic justification of existence and the world that Nietzsche 
demanded of Greek tragedy, as well as the necessary counterforce to both the dialectical 
reduction of history to linear progress and the biopolitical administration of life. 
This Nietzschean insistence on the productive priority of poiesis and poetry to reason 
and truth represents a final rebuke to Hegel, who famously proclaimed in his Lectures on 
Aesthetics that poetry, “the universal art of the mind which has become free in its own nature”, 
must end “by transcending itself, inasmuch as it abandons the medium of a harmonious 
embodiment of mind in sensuous form, and passes from the poetry of imagination into the 
prose of thought”.102 For the dialectical tradition of modernity, poetry can only serve as a 
temporary relay for spirit, an imaginative detour that must close once philosophical reason 
reaches maturity. For the anti-moderns Leopardi, Nietzsche and Negri, however, poetry is the 
constituent power that constantly though discontinuously produces true illusions, and as such it 
can only be suppressed temporarily by the institutionalization of reason, whether pure or 
instrumental. For Negri, Leopardi’s example points forward directly to Wittgenstein and the 
“linguistic turn” his work gave to philosophy and social science: 
 
Wittgenstein’s discourse reveals to us a new world of production, one made of signs and 
woven by the community. The community alone produces, but by means of signs; in 
other words, signs are productive insofar as they are the expression of the community. 
Moreover, signs sketch the contours of reality and emancipate meaning: the 
relationship between community and production of signs is thus real, ontological.103 
 
From here it is only a relatively short step — by way of Marx’s notion of living labor — 
to the tendency toward immaterial labor and network resistance that defines Hardt and Negri’s 
conception of the subject as self-made through communication and the multitude as 
counter-empire, and it is no accident that the chapter with that title in Empire, the “Intermezzo” 
around which its entire argument pivots, is filled with poetic and literary references, to the poet 
and dramatist Nanni Balestrini and the novelists John Dos Passos, Elio Vittorini, Kathy Acker, 
William Gibson and William S. Burroughs. Nor is Negri’s recent foray onto the dramatic stage 
                                                             
102 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, trans. Bernard Bosanquet (New York: Penguin, 1993), p.96. 
This line of thinking later leads Negri to a similar rebuke of Adorno: “It’s not straightforwardly true anymore that 
poetry has become impossible after Auschwitz, as Adorno claimed, just as it’s no longer straightforwardly true that all 
hope has perished after Hiroshima, as Günther Anders asserted; poetry and hope have been revitalized by the 
postmodern multitudes, yet their measure is no longer homogeneous with that of the poetry and the hope of 
modernity” (Negri, “Art and Culture in the Age of Empire and the Time of the Multitudes”, p.51). 
103 Negri, “Wittgenstein and Pain: Sociological Consequences”, trans. Timothy S. Murphy, in Genre: Forms 
of Discourse and Culture volume 37: 3-4 (2004), p.361. 
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with his Trilogie de la différence (Essaim: Didactique du militant, L’Homme plié: Didactique 
du rebelle and Citheron: Didactique de l’exode)104 a matter of chance. Drama is poetry, and 
poetry, linguistic poiesis, is counter-power, constituent power, ontological action or activism. To 
cite Negri’s account of Leopardi one last time, “When it conflicts with the world, in the tragedy 
of life, poetry can create new being. The ontological power of poetry becomes historically 
effective, and thus illusion can become truth.”105 
                                                             
104 The Trilogie de la différence is forthcoming from Editions Stock, Paris. The plays comprising it have been 
staged in Paris, Rome and elsewhere. His recent collaboration with Raffaella Battaglini, the dialogue Settanta (Rome: 
DeriveApprodi, 2007), also appears to be part of this development. 
105 Negri, “Between Infinity and Community” p.75. 
